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Journal Articles Journal of Economic Theory Year : 2008

Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Jérôme Mathis
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Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien

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https://hal-univ-paris8.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00991369

Submitted on : Thursday, May 15, 2014-10:40:49 AM

Last modification on : Wednesday, April 28, 2021-10:20:37 PM

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hal-00991369 , version 1 (15-05-2014)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00991369 , version 1

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Jérôme Mathis. Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion. Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, pp.571-584. ⟨hal-00991369⟩

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