Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

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https://hal-univ-paris8.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00991369
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Submitted on : Thursday, May 15, 2014 - 10:40:49 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, May 22, 2018 - 8:40:08 PM

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Jérôme Mathis. Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2008, pp.571-584. ⟨hal-00991369⟩

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